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Abstract
This research examines the extent to which proactivity in handling flight overbooking reduces negative electronic word-of-mouth
(NeWOM) and the required costs of compensation, thus increasing firm profitability. It answers recent calls to use a multimethod
approach (i.e., we include archival data, qualitative interviews, seven experiments, and a Monte Carlo simulation for a total of 10
studies) and to adapt recovery to specific contexts (i.e., airlines) and heterogeneous customers (i.e., voluntary/involuntary
bumping or offloading). The preliminary studies indicate that overbooking and offloading are pervasive and that a proactive
approach is both feasible and desirable. The experiments show that, compared to the default reactive approach (informing
passengers at the gate), a proactive approach (informing them before they leave for the airport) substantially reduces NeWOM
and the sought compensation. Further, a very reactive approach (informing them in the plane) significantly increases NeWOM and
the sought compensation, especially when offloading occurs involuntarily. We also unveil the mechanism explaining the effects of
proactivity on NeWOM, through the serial mediation of justice and betrayal. Finally, the results of a Monte Carlo simulation show
that offering reduced compensation through a proactive approach allows more aggressive overbooking, higher capacity utilization,
and increased net revenue of up to 1.3%.
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Flight overbooking (i.e., selling more tickets than available
seats) is pervasive1 in the airline industry (Amaruchkul and
Sae-Lim 2011). It is a legal practice to account for no-shows
and cancellations (Phillips 2005) to allow airlines to improve
their load factors and reduce revenue losses (Guo, Dong, and
Ling 2016). Yet, it is difficult to forecast no-shows and can-
cellations, leaving an uncertain number of surplus customers
needing to be offloaded or bumped (Wehner, López-Bonilla,
and Santos 2018). Affected customers may feel treated unfairly
and potentially vent their anger on social media, which can
result in viral crises. A widely covered offloading incident
involved a doctor being dragged off an overbooked United
Airlines plane. It received around 4 million views on Facebook,
bestowing unwanted notoriety on the airline and a decline of
US$1.4 billion in market capitalization (Benoit 2018). Hence,
it appears crucial to prevent such incidents and the resulting
negative electronic word-of-mouth (NeWOM).
A common remedy for offloading is to provide monetary
compensation (Pizam 2017). If passengers are offloaded volun-
tarily, a mutually agreed amount is offered; but when they are
denied boarding involuntarily, the compensation regulations
apply. For instance, U.S. customers are entitled to receive
200% of their one-way fare (up to US$675) for minor delays,
and 400% of their one-way fare (up to US$1,350) for major
delays, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation
(USDOT 2019). From a managerial perspective, this practice
is problematic because the compensation paid is substantial and
reduces profitability in an industry where margins are tight.
From a theoretical perspective, overbooking is also critical,
as compensation should reimburse customers not only for their
missed flight but also for the hassle associated with their evic-
tion (Wirtz and Mattila 2004). Equity theory (Oliver 2014)
suggests that customers are dissatisfied not only by a concrete
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service failure but also by a broader sense of inequity, involv-
ing humiliation and other negative perceptions. Perceived
inequity may be particularly high for customers who are invo-
luntarily offloaded, given their monetary input (e.g., ticket
price), added effort and inconvenience (e.g., required rebook-
ing, check-in, and lost time), and psychological distress (e.g.,
confrontation, stress, and potential embarrassment). Hence, it is
questionable whether the legal compensation is effective at
restoring a broader sense of equity and preventing NeWOM.
We address this problem by showing that proactive han-
dling of flight overbooking restores equity and prevents
NeWOM at only a fraction of the cost of offloading reactively.
In broad terms, proactivity is defined as anticipating and pre-
venting problems before they materialize (Bateman and Crant
1999). In the current context, we refer to proactivity (vs. reac-
tivity) as bringing forward (vs. delaying) the moment when
passengers are informed about being offloaded to reduce the
potential negative consequences. Here, we distinguish between
three approaches on the proactivity-reactivity continuum: a
default reactive approach (informing customers at the gate), a
proactive approach (informing them before they leave for the
airport, hereafter referred to as at home), and a very reactive
approach (informing them after boarding).
Specifically, the current research makes four key contribu-
tions to the service literature. First, we introduce the concept of
proactivity to the service recovery literature and apply it to the
airline industry. In doing so, we respond to recent literature
reviews that have identified a lack of research on the prerecov-
ery phase and adaptive recovery (Khamitov, Grégoire, and Suri
2020; Ringberg, Odekerken-Schröder, and Christensen 2007;
Van Vaerenbergh et al. 2019). This research addresses both
gaps by presenting a new, preemptive recovery tool (i.e., proac-
tively offering a specific compensation) that needs to be
adapted depending on the type of offloading (i.e., voluntary
or involuntary) and the communication timing (e.g., at home, at
the airport or in the plane). Specifically, we find that a highly
proactive approach (at home) makes travelers accept minimal
compensation—about 5% of the legal amount. In turn, a very
reactive approach, when the traveler is in the plane, requires up
to 500% of the legal amount.
Second, we further enrich adaptive recovery research by
distinguishing between involuntary and voluntary offloading
as different contexts. Involuntary offloading refers to custom-
ers being forced to give up their seat, whereas voluntary off-
loading refers to customers agreeing to give up their seat
amicably in exchange for compensation. The examination of
these two contexts is important because most offloading situa-
tions occur on a voluntary basis (although involuntary offload-
ing remains frequent). We show that when passengers are
voluntarily offloaded, the compensation can be reduced by
50% compared with involuntary offloading. These findings
enrich prior research, which shows that complainers report
higher fairness when having a choice over the recovery offered
by firms (Mattila and Cranage 2005).
Third, we unveil the mechanism explaining the effects of
proactivity on NeWOM through the serial mediation of justice
and betrayal (Noone 2012; Wangenheim and Bayón 2007).
Indeed, more reactive approaches tend to be viewed as acts
of betrayal because the airline has intentionally violated an
implicit promise (e.g., see Grégoire and Fisher 2008). Hence,
we argue for the serial sequence “proactivity  justice 
betrayal  NeWOM” in most situations.
Fourth, we demonstrate the effects of different compensa-
tion levels on firm profitability at different proactivity degrees.
Here, a Monte Carlo simulation shows that proactive handling
of overbooking can simultaneously reduce NeWOM and
increase profitability. Specifically, we found that net revenues
increase from 0.1% to 1.3% for flights with excess demand
through reduced compensation with a proactive approach.
Thus, we address an important gap in the service literature:
showing the effects of recovery tools on financial metrics (Kha-
mitov, Grégoire, and Suri 2020; Van Vaerenbergh et al. 2019).
Theoretical Development
Flight Overbooking as an Intentional Service Failure
A service failure occurs when customers perceive that the ini-
tial service delivery falls below their expectations or “zone of
tolerance” (Holloway and Beatty 2003). In this regard, Hirsch-
man (1970) states that apart from accepting a service failure
and remaining loyal, customers have two options: exit the rela-
tionship or communicate their dissatisfaction (i.e., voice).
Typically, voice refers to a complaint to the firm, but Hirsch-
man (1970) acknowledges that customers may not do so when
they believe complaining is futile. Hence, another form of
voice has been added: Communicating one’s dissatisfaction
by spreading negative WOM, which can be more detrimental
as it occurs beyond a firm’s control. Further, it can seriously
damage a firm’s image and prevent other customers from using
its services (Hogan, Lemon, and Libai 2003).
The mass adoption of social media has empowered custom-
ers to electronically share their negative feelings with many
others (Balaji, Khong, and Chong 2016). Accordingly, our key
outcome of interest is NeWOM defined as disgruntled people
promoting negative information about a firm on various online
platforms (Wilson, Giebelhausen, and Brady 2017). NeWOM
has significant detrimental impacts on other customers’ prod-
uct evaluation, decision making, and loyalty because of its
reach and persuasive intent (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Ver-
meulen and Seegers 2009).
The airline industry is particularly prone to service failures
(Palmer and Bejou 2016) including, for example, delays, lost
luggage, or unfriendly service. In contrast to these service
flaws, we consider flight overbooking to be an intentional ser-
vice failure. It is a deliberate operational act with a clear prob-
ability—that is, the number of booked passengers exceeding
the number of available seats. Firms actively implement over-
booking to optimize capacity utilization and maximize profit.
Thus, airlines are unlikely to eliminate overbooking, even
though it affects hundreds of thousands of passengers annually
(Noone 2012). As a result, airlines need to deploy tactics to
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mitigate the negative consequences of overbooking, and we
propose that proactivity could be an effective tactic to pursue.
Proactivity in Handling Flight Overbooking
Bateman and Crant (1999, p. 2) state that proactive behavior
in an organization is “to anticipate and prevent problems”
before they arise. Accordingly, we define proactivity in a
service failure and recovery context as firms anticipating
potential service failures and acting prior to customer reac-
tions to control or minimize the impact of these failures. As
such, a proactive approach represents a forward-focused
action, which allows firms to focus on preventing negative
customer responses to a service failure rather than correction
(Challagalla, Venkatesh, and Kohli 2009). Examples include
informing customers about potential problems, actively seek-
ing customer feedback regardless of the success or failure of
past interactions (Voorhees et al. 2017), and assisting custom-
ers before they encounter service failures. These approaches
tend to be beneficial for customers because they can signal a
firm’s sense of caring at an early stage and thereby mitigate a
potential crisis. Further, by recognizing potential conflicts
earlier, firms can offer a faster resolution (Challagalla, Ven-
katesh, and Kohli 2009) and, as a result, ensure superior ser-
vice quality (Pomirleanu, Mariadoss, and Chennamaneni
2016). Indeed, there is growing empirical evidence that a
proactive (vs. reactive) interaction increases favorable cus-
tomer outcomes and reduces negative customer attitudes and
behaviors (Mikolon, Quaiser, and Wieseke 2015; Pomirleanu,
Mariadoss, and Chennamaneni 2016).
Aviation experts also believe that proactively handling
overbooking could help reduce its negative consequences
such as NeWOM (Powley 2017). Airlines often wait until
passengers arrive at the airport and offload them at the gate
or, even worse, when they are in the plane (a very reactive
approach). In contrast to these approaches, airlines could
inform passengers in advance, before they leave for the air-
port (a proactive approach). The default reactive approach at
the gate is not ideal because it causes much inconvenience.
Customers have to return home or, when accepting to be
booked on a later flight, have to wait for several hours at the
airport. Compared to this default reactive approach, a proac-
tive approach avoids this stress and hassle. For example, cus-
tomers learn at home that the flight is overbooked, and they
can rearrange travel plans from the comfort of their home. A
very reactive approach comprises even more hassle than the
default reactive situation. Here, customers have already
boarded and are “ready to go.” Hence, they may feel humi-
liated and be reluctant to give up their seat. Overall, we expect
that, compared to the default reactive approach, a proactive
(very reactive) handling of overbooking will decrease
(increase) NeWOM.
We draw on equity theory (Adams 1965)—which is influ-
enced by the theory of social exchange (Homans 1958)—to
explain the effects of proactivity. Equity theory highlights the
“rule of justice” as a social norm, which prescribes that people
who engage in social interactions expect the rewards for both
parties to be proportional to their investments. If people per-
ceive that they benefit less than their counterparts, they feel
entitled to proportionally reduce their investments or require an
ex post increase in their rewards (Homans 1961). In case of a
service failure, customers feel disadvantaged because their
reward is decreased since they cannot (fully) use the service
they paid for. They perceive that their relationship with the firm
becomes unbalanced, as their reward-investment ratio is
smaller. However, firms can restore perceived justice when
providing an appropriate recovery (e.g., compensation) to
increase customers’ rewards ex post. Indeed, the service failure
literature presents justice as the dominant theory in this context
(Wirtz and Mattila 2004), and justice perceptions are shown to
mediate the effect of organizational strategies on customer
reactions (Gelbrich and Roschk 2011).
Grégoire and Fisher (2008) further articulate this link, argu-
ing that when perceived justice is low, customers may feel
betrayed. Perceived betrayal is a “belief that a firm has inten-
tionally violated what is normative in the context of their
relationship” (Grégoire and Fisher 2008, p. 250). Customers
think that the firm did not comply with the norm to provide a
seamless service in exchange for the price paid (Van Vaeren-
bergh, Larivière, and Vermeir 2012). This belief, in turn, ulti-
mately drives customers’ retaliatory behaviors, such as
NeWOM.
We apply this reasoning to the current context, where
affected customers may not only perceive injustice (as they are
offloaded from a particular flight they paid for) but also feel
betrayed (as offloading is an intentional violation of the norm
to deliver the promised service). This is where proactivity
comes into play. In the case of a very reactive approach (off-
loading in the plane), the hassle for customers is extremely
high. First, they are escorted out of the airplane as if they were
undesirable customers. Then, they need to rearrange their travel
plans and wait at the airport. Accordingly, a very reactive
approach should further increase injustice perceptions and,
thus, perceived betrayal, which then facilitates NeWOM. In
contrast, a proactive approach (informing customers at home)
enables customers to conveniently adjust their travel plans.
This behavior may help to restore a more balanced “reward
to investment” ratio for customers because they benefit from
a more convenient process (an increased reward to investment
ratio). Hence, firms will have complied with the norm of pro-
viding the best service in the given overbooking situation.
Thus, a proactive approach reduces injustice perceptions as
well as perceptions of betrayal, ultimately decreasing
NeWOM. Formally:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to the default reactive approach in
the handling of flight overbooking, the decrease (increase)
of NeWOM through a proactive (very reactive) approach
can be explained by a serial mediation: proactivity 
increased perceived justice  decreased perceived betrayal
 decreased NeWOM.
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Compensation Levels at Different Degrees of Proactivity
Service recovery research shows that monetary compensation
for a service failure has positive effects on customer responses
(Roschk and Gelbrich 2017). These effects are also explained
by justice perceptions, as compensation can restore equity
through an improvement of the reward to investment ratio
(Andreassen 2000; Mostafa et al. 2015). A core question in this
context is to identify an effective (but not excessive) level of
compensation (Gelbrich, Gäthke, and Grégoire 2015; Roggev-
een, Tsiros, and Grewal 2012). Some studies suggest that even
small amounts can be effective (Davidow 2003; Wirtz and
Mattila 2004), while others suggest that overcompensation may
be required to improve perceived justice and reduce NeWOM
(Migacz, Zou, and Petrick 2018; Wangenheim and Bayón
2007). Overall, the effect of compensation tends to be stronger
with increasing levels, but at declining incremental rates (Gel-
brich, Gäthke, and Grégoire 2015). Building on this literature,
what could be an effective compensation strategy in an airline
overbooking context?
We argue that some form of adaptive compensation is
needed (Khamitov, Grégoire, and Suri 2020), depending on the
proactivity level displayed by the airline. In other words, there
is no universal amount of compensation that would fit all situa-
tions. We argue that the more proactive an airline is, the lower
the compensation could be. Specifically, proactivity should
play a key role in moderating the effectiveness of compensa-
tion on NeWOM. Here, proactivity represents a key divider of
compensation, whereas reactivity is a key multiplying factor.
Compared to denying boarding at the gate (i.e., default
reactive-gate approach), informing passengers before leaving
their homes (i.e., proactive-home approach) demonstrates that
an airline is sincere, empathetic, and just. In this context, a
much lower level of compensation—a small fraction of what
would be required at the gate—would restore the reward to
investment ratio, resulting in minimal NeWOM. By contrast,
when passengers need to leave the plane because of overbook-
ing (i.e., very reactive-plane approach), high amounts of
compensation—many times the amount required at the
gate—would be needed to rebalance the equity ratio (restore
justice) and reduce NeWOM. Formally:
Hypothesis 2: Proactivity moderates the effect of compen-
sation on NeWOM such that a proactive (very reactive)
approach requires a fraction (multiplication) of the required
compensation compared to the default reactive approach.
The Moderating Role of Voluntariness
We also propose that the voluntary or involuntary context of
offloading moderates the effect of compensation on NeWOM.
Theoretically, voluntary offloading can take place at any stage,
from a proactive home approach to a very reactive offloading
situation in the plane. However, in real life, passengers may
only be involuntarily offloaded in the reactive-gate or very
reactive-plane conditions. Offloading passengers at home is
typically voluntary; there is enough time to find volunteers
even if some passengers refuse to be offloaded. Hence, we pay
special attention to the two reactive situations (i.e., at the gate
and in the plane) in this section.
The Civil Aeronautics Board introduced the “voluntary auc-
tion scheme” in 1978 to reduce involuntary offloading. Accord-
ing to this regulation, at times of overbooking, airlines must ask
for volunteers for the next flight in exchange for incentives at
the airline’s discretion. To do so, airlines first try to identify
volunteers; and, if more offloading is still needed, they proceed
with involuntarily offloading by following certain rules
(Garrow, Kressner, and Mumbower 2011).
When a flight is overbooked and customers are denied
boarding involuntarily, airlines in the United States are legally
required to pay up to US$1,350 in compensation (subject to
some conditions). However, passengers can voluntarily agree
to be offloaded at a much lower compensation level. For exam-
ple, United Airlines and American Airlines allow passengers to
volunteer to reschedule their flights and to state their desired
compensation in case of overbooking.
Voluntary offloading means that customers are offered a
choice: forfeiting their seat in exchange for compensation or
insisting on being boarded. Having a choice is generally asso-
ciated with self-responsibility, and this heightened self-control
can improve perceptions of justice (Mattila and Cranage 2005).
Indeed, Wittman (2014) finds that voluntary offloading does
not increase complaints, although involuntary denying does.
Further, customers perceive different levels of acceptable ser-
vice—due to personal circumstances—that result in fluctua-
tions in their zone of tolerance (Zeithaml, Berry, and
Parasuraman 1993). That is, customers voluntarily accepting
to be offloaded may be flexible to travel at a later time, may
perceive the inconvenience as less severe, and view the rewards
as attractive (e.g., compensation, free meals, and accommoda-
tion), which restores the equity ratio and reduces NeWOM. As
such, the compensation necessary to significantly reduce
NeWOM should be much lower when customers step back
voluntarily rather than involuntarily. Formally:
Hypothesis 3: In reactive (at the gate) and very reactive
offloading (in the plane), voluntariness moderates the effect
of compensation on NeWOM such that a smaller compen-
sation is needed for voluntary compared to involuntary
offloading.
Overview of Studies
The empirical section comprises 10 studies. First, we con-
ducted two preliminary studies to justify our research by using
archival data and airline expert interviews. Study 1 then experi-
mentally tests the effects of proactive versus reactive offload-
ing on NeWOM and the mechanism explaining this effect
(Hypothesis 1). Studies 2a, 2b, and 2c experimentally test the
compensation levels required to reduce NeWOM at different
degrees of proactivity-reactivity (Hypothesis 2). Studies 3a, 3b,
and 3c further refine the proactivity-reactivity approaches.
4 Journal of Service Research XX(X)
Study 3a explores different intervention times for the
proactive-home strategy; whereas studies 3b and 3c examine
the effect of voluntariness for the reactive-gate and very
reactive-plane situations (Hypothesis 3). Finally, Study 4 is a
Monte Carlo simulation that analyzes the impact of the com-
pensation levels derived from our prior studies on an airline’s
net revenue.
Preliminary Studies
Archival Data Analysis
This preliminary study was used to show that overbooking is an
ongoing and common practice. It was based on archival data
from the Air Travel Consumer Report published by the
USDOT (2019). It contains information on the number of
enplaned passengers, expressed in terms of voluntary and invo-
luntary denied boarding, and we analyzed the frequencies of
denied boarding by the four largest U.S. airlines (American,
Delta, Southwest, and United) from 2008 to mid-2019 (see
Web Appendix B1). The results show that denied boarding
occurs frequently with values ranging from about 45,000 pas-
sengers (about 3 per 10,000 passengers for Southwest Airlines
in 2017) to almost 150,000 passengers (almost 12 per 10,000
passengers for Delta in 2015). Most offloading was voluntary
(despite frequent involuntary instances).
These results show that overbooking in the U.S. airline
industry occurs continually. At first glance, the relative values
(per 10,000 passengers) seem low. Yet large providers like
American Airlines handle more than 100 million customers per
year; and as a result, absolute values of denied boarding are
high, with hundreds of thousands of customers affected every
year. Hence, offloading is a pervasive issue that warrants fur-
ther investigation. Although airlines follow the “voluntary auc-
tion scheme,” involuntary offloading still affects thousands of
passengers every year. Although the frequency of this practice
is relatively low, its effects on individuals and airlines are
consequential. To examine the reasons for and practices of
offloading, we next interviewed industry experts.
Airline Expert Interviews
We conducted six interviews with industry experts across three
continents (see Web Appendix A1 for details). We used theore-
tical sampling and conducted interviews until we reached satura-
tion at the sixth interview (Glaser and Strauss 2017). A
semistructured interview guide was used to explore the (1) fre-
quency of overbooking, (2) accuracy of no-show predictions,
(3) timing and selection criteria for offloading, (4) voluntary
versus involuntary offloading, and (5) compensation offered.
Overbooking frequency. All experts agreed that overbooking is a
common practice around the world. There are differences
between airlines (e.g., high-end airlines tend to be less aggres-
sive in their policies) and booking classes (e.g., overbooking is
most prevalent for economy class). Furthermore, all experts
agreed that overbooking leads to offloading.
Accuracy of no-show predictions. There seem to be vast differ-
ences between airlines’ ability to predict no-shows. Best prac-
tice airlines use sophisticated algorithms, increasingly
supported by artificial intelligence (AI), to predict no-shows.
These algorithms include a large variety of factors, such as
departure time, day of the week, school holidays, peak times
for business travel, and destinations. Furthermore, early check-
in and booking information help to enhance prediction accu-
racy. For instance, passengers who check in early and families
and groups are less likely to be no-shows. However, better
predictive capabilities do not eliminate offloading. Rather, they
allow airlines to achieve load factors closer to 100% without
increasing offloading. In addition, flight disruptions are fre-
quent (e.g., due to bad weather, technical issues, and delayed
connecting flights) and can also lead to overbooking. Conse-
quently, offloading will remain part of the airline business,
regardless of prediction capabilities.
Timing and selection criteria. The timing of offloading depends on
the technical sophistication of an airline and its customer orien-
tation. Most offloading happens at check-in or at the gate.
However, a few leading airlines have already introduced proac-
tive offloading, which occurs 24–48 hours before departure.
These are viewed as best practices, and the interviewed experts
believe that proactive offloading will become more common in
the future. Importantly, most airlines do not offload customers
with high loyalty status. The more passenger-oriented airlines
are also careful not to offload certain passengers, such as fam-
ilies, groups, and customers with connecting flights.
Voluntary versus involuntary offloading. Both are common. How-
ever, the airlines with the best reputations strive to minimize
involuntary offloading. Airlines that still use a lot of involun-
tary offloading are reputed—at least among our experts—to be
less customer oriented. These airlines tend to have fewer and
less well-trained employees at the airport to handle voluntary
offloading.
Compensation. All interviewees agreed that the compensation
offered varies according to several factors. For example, com-
pensation tends to be higher for offloading that is close to
departure time (vs. earlier), involuntary (vs. voluntary), long-
haul (vs. short-haul) flights, and without a convenient alterna-
tive. Furthermore, a few airlines experiment with reservation
and online check-in systems that allow customers to opt in for
potential offloading. Here, travelers can specify the amount
they would accept for a certain delay period (e.g., up to a few
hours or next day departure). These systems allow airlines to
offload passengers when needed at the lowest cost, while still
ensuring passenger satisfaction.
Discussion
The two preliminary studies show that overbooking is perva-
sive and affects hundreds of thousands of customers in the
United States. Although voluntary offloading is considered
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best practice, involuntary offloading still occurs and is partic-
ularly detrimental to customers and airlines. Importantly, a
proactive handling of overbooking seems both beneficial and
feasible, especially for progressive airlines with AI-based pre-
dictive models. Finally, it seems that informing passengers at
an early stage reduces NeWOM and the amount of sought
compensation.
Study 1: Proactivity in Offloading
Purpose, Sample, and Procedure
Study 1 tests if proactivity (reactivity) reduces (increases)
NeWOM explained by a serial mediation through justice and
betrayal (Hypothesis 1) and rules out alternative explanations.
We conducted a scenario-based experiment using audiovisual
stimuli. In total, 108 U.S. participants (Mage ¼ 31.9, female ¼
50.9%) were recruited via Clickworker that is a crowd-based
consumer panel in different countries including the United
States. We used a one-factor between-subjects design with
three proactivity degrees (proactive-home, default reactive-
gate, very reactive-plane), and respondents were randomly
assigned to one of the conditions (here and also in all subse-
quent studies). The core scenario describes a passenger who
plans to go on holiday but is informed that the flight is over-
booked. He/she is now on a waiting list to be rebooked later
(see Web Appendix A2 for vignettes).
The proactivity-reactivity dimension was manipulated by
varying the point in time when the passenger learns about the
overbooking. In the default reactive-gate condition, the pas-
senger has checked in and passed the security check and is
waiting at the boarding gate when he/she is informed that the
flight is overbooked. In the proactive-home condition, the pas-
senger is still at home when he/she is contacted by the airline 8
hours before the flight. Eight hours was determined as a starting
point for our research on the basis of having to be at the airport
3 hours before the departure and up to 2 hours travel time to the
airport. But, for someone who needs to take an early morning
flight (e.g., at 6 a.m.), a 5-hour window may not be practical.
Therefore, we chose the 8-hour intervention time to ensure that
people can be contacted in advance regardless of the time of the
flight. While our interview experts suggested earlier interven-
tion times (i.e., 24–48 hours)—which is tested in Study 3a—
this study uses a conservative time that enables better predic-
tion of no-shows. For the very reactive-plane condition, the
passenger has already boarded the plane; but after being
informed about the overbooking, he/she is escorted off the
plane. The core scenario continues by stating that the next
available flight is tomorrow afternoon. After reading the sce-
nario, the respondents were asked to imagine themselves in the
situation before answering a series of questions.
The dependent variable NeWOM was measured by 3 items
adapted from Grégoire, Laufer, and Tripp (2010; e.g., I would
complain about the issue through social media to make public
the behaviors and practices of the airline; a ¼ .94). The
mediator-perceived justice was measured by 7 items taken
from Roschk and Gelbrich (2017) and Grégoire, Laufer, and
Tripp (2010; e.g., The outcome I received was fair; a ¼ .92).
Perceived betrayal was captured by 5 items taken from
Grégoire and Fisher (2008; e.g., Because of this incident, I
would feel betrayed; a ¼ .93). As controls, we measured ser-
vice importance (single item) and failure severity (3 items, a ¼
.92) with semantic differential scales adapted from Hess, Gane-
san, and Klein (2003) and blame attributions (3 items, a ¼ .91)
adapted from Gelbrich, Gäthke, and Grégoire (2015). Unless
otherwise stated, items were measured on 7-point Likert-type
scales anchored at 1 ¼ strongly disagree and 7 ¼ strongly
agree (see Web Appendix A3).
Manipulations Check
The proactivity manipulation was checked using six self-
developed items on a semantic differential scale of 1–11
(e.g., I believe the airline’s efforts in dealing with the over-
booking incident was reactive [1] . . . proactive [11]; a ¼ .95).
The mean values differed significantly across the three condi-
tions in the desired direction, Mhome ¼ 8.31 > Mgate ¼ 6.21 >
Mplane ¼ 3.49, F(2, 97) ¼ 30.18, p < .001. As an attention
check, crosstabs for the three experimental conditions and the
manipulation check of proactivity showed that 97.1%, 94.1%,
and 87.2% of the subjects correctly indicated that they received
the overbooking information at the gate, at home, or in the
plane, respectively. The manipulation worked as intended, and
we removed respondents with incorrect answers, resulting in a
net sample of n ¼ 100. Respondents perceived the scenario as
realistic (MRealism ¼ 5.86 vs. scale midpoint 4.00, p < .001).
Results
Prior to formally testing Hypothesis 1, we examined the main
effects of proactivity-reactivity on the dependent variable and
mediators. Three analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were
conducted, using the proactivity-reactivity manipulation as the
independent variable and NeWOM, justice, and betrayal,
respectively, as the dependent variables. All ANCOVAs
included service importance, severity, and blame as controls.
Results for NeWOM indicate a significant main effect of
proactivity-reactivity, F(2, 94) ¼ 14.33, p < .001, Z2 ¼ .23.
Post hoc tests reveal that compared to the default reactive-gate
condition (Mgate ¼ 4.42), the level of NeWOM is significantly
lower in the proactive-home condition (Mhome¼ 3.23, p < .01),
but significantly higher in the very reactive-plane condition
(Mplane ¼ 5.27, p < .05).
A mirror-inverted pattern can be observed for the mediator
perceived justice. Results indicate a significant main effect of
proactivity, F(2, 94)¼ 16.57, p < .001, Z2¼ .26. Post hoc tests
show that compared to the default reactive-gate condition
(Mgate ¼ 4.51), justice is significantly higher in the proactive-
home condition (Mhome ¼ 5.13, p < .05), but significantly
lower in the very reactive-plane condition (Mplane ¼ 3.44,
p < .001). For the mediator perceived betrayal, the main effect
of proactivity is also significant, F(2, 94) ¼ 10.39, p < .001,
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Z2 ¼ .18. Post hoc tests indicate the same pattern as for
NeWOM: Compared to the default reactive-gate condition
(Mgate ¼ 4.00), the level of betrayal is significantly lower in
the proactive-home condition (Mhome ¼ 3.13, p < .01), but
higher in the very reactive-plane condition (Mplane ¼ 4.64,
p ¼ .05). The controls are significant at the 5% level in all
analyses, except for failure severity in the ANCOVA for
NeWOM (p ¼ .24).
Test of Hypothesis 1
The sequential processing “proactivity-reactivity  justice 
betrayal  NeWOM” was tested using PROCESS Model 6
(Hayes 2017). As the independent variable proactivity-
reactivity dimension is multicategorical, the first group (default
reactive-gate) served as a baseline, which was tested against the
two other conditions (Hayes 2017). Again, service importance,
severity, and blame were used as controls.
Figure 1 (Panel A) shows the mediation results for a
proactive-home approach (vs. the default reactive-gate
approach). Regression analyses show a significant positive
effect of proactivity on justice (b ¼ .62, p < .05), a significant
negative effect of justice on betrayal (b ¼ .46, p < .001), and
a significant positive effect of betrayal on NeWOM (b ¼ .57,
p < .001). Further, the direct effect of the proactivity-reactivity
on NeWOM is nonsignificant at the 5% level when the two
mediators are conjointly included (b ¼ .64, p ¼ .06), com-
pared to a model without the mediators (b ¼ 1.19, p < .01).
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the serial indirect effect is
negative and significant, as indicated by the 95% confidence
interval excluding zero (.16, 95% confidence interval [CI] ¼
[.39, .02]). The simple mediations going through justice or
betrayal alone are nonsignificant (see indirect effects at the
upper left side of Panel A).
Figure 1 (Panel B) depicts the mediation results for a very
reactive-plane approach (vs. the default reactive-gate
approach). Regression analyses show a significant negative
effect of proactivity on justice (b ¼ 1.08, p < .001), a signif-
icant negative effect of justice on betrayal (b¼.46, p < .001),
and a significant positive effect of betrayal on NeWOM
(b ¼ .57, p < .001). Further, the significant direct effect of
proactivity on NeWOM (b ¼ .86, p < .05) becomes nonsigni-
ficant when the two mediators are conjointly included (b¼ .41,
p ¼ .24). Importantly, the serial indirect effect is positive and
significant, as indicated by the 95% confidence interval exclud-
ing zero (b ¼ .28, 95% CI [.08, .59]), while the simple media-
tions going through justice or betrayal are nonsignificant. In
sum, the results support Hypothesis 1.
Ruling Out a Reversed Causal Effect
Another mediation analysis was conducted to rule out a
reversed causal effect for the two mediators by testing the
following sequence: “proactivity-reactivity  betrayal  jus-
tice  NeWOM.” The corresponding indirect effects for
default reactive-gate versus proactive-home (b ¼ .03, 95%
CI [.13, .05]) and default reactive-gate versus very reactive-
plane (b ¼ .02, 95% CI [.04, .10]) are nonsignificant.
Figure 1. Results of serial mediation analyses (Study 1). (Panel A) Effects of a higher proactivity compared with the default-gate approach. (Panel
B) Effects of a higher reactivity compared with the default-gate approach.
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Discussion
Study 1 supports Hypothesis 1 and shows that a proactive
approach decreases and a very reactive approach increases
NeWOM mediated by justice and betrayal. While it is com-
mon practice to inform passengers at the gate that their flight
is overbooked, informing customers earlier (i.e., at home)
significantly reduces NeWOM, whereas informing them later
(i.e., in the plane) further increases NeWOM. These results
support the view that informing passengers early about over-
booking—at best at home, at least at the boarding gate, but
not in the plane—reduces NeWOM. This effect can be
explained by a serial mediation: Proactivity increases justice
perceptions, which, in turn, reduce feelings of betrayal and
thus reduce NeWOM. A reversed reasoning (betrayal  jus-
tice) can be ruled out.
Study 2a: Compensation Levels
Purpose, Sample, and Procedure
Study 2a tests how much compensation is effective in reducing
NeWOM at different degrees of proactivity-reactivity (Hypoth-
esis 2), with Studies 2b and 2c refining the compensation
amounts. We used a 3 (proactivity: proactive-home, default
reactive-gate, and very reactive-plane)  4 (compensation: low,
medium-legal, high, excessive) between-subjects design with
12 conditions. The sample comprised 413 U.S. participants
(Mage ¼ 34.2, female ¼ 67.3%) recruited via Clickworker.
The first part of the scenario describes the same overbook-
ing situation as in Study 1, manipulating proactivity-reactivity
at the same three degrees: proactive-home, default reactive-
gate, and very reactive-plane. Compensation level was manipu-
lated in the second part of the scenario at four different levels:
US$675, US$1,350, US$2,700, and US$10,000. The medium-
legal level of US$1,350 for involuntary offloading with a major
delay (USDOT 2019) served as a 100% reference point.
Accordingly, 50% (US$675) and 200% of this value
(US$2,700) were used as low and high levels of compensation,
respectively. Further, in response to the rise in customers’
awareness, many airlines such as United and Delta have now
increased their compensation up to US$10,000 for passengers
who are willing to give up a seat (Hankel 2017). Therefore,
US$10,000, which is roughly 700% of the legally required
compensation level, was included as an excessive compensa-
tion level. In line with Basso and Pizzutti (2016), we measured
NeWOM after the first (i.e., after the overbooking incident and
before receiving compensation, T1) and the second part of the
scenario (i.e., after receiving compensation, T2), which
allowed us to examine the effectiveness of each compensation
level compared to the baseline. We used the same scales for
NeWOM (a in T1 ¼ .91, a in T2 ¼ .94), the controls, and
manipulation checks as in Study 1 (the latter two measured
at T1).
Manipulation Checks
Of the respondents, 97%, 89%, and 82% correctly indicated
that they received the overbooking information at the gate, at
home, and in the plane, respectively. Hence, the manipulation
was successful. For further analyses, we removed respondents
with incorrect answers, yielding a net sample of 364 partici-
pants. As the different compensation levels are a direct and
observable form of manipulation, a manipulation check was
not deemed necessary (Perdue and Summers 1986). The
respondents perceived the scenarios as realistic (MRealism ¼
5.82 > 4.00, p < .001).
Results
As in Study 1, an ANCOVA was conducted with proactivity-
reactivity and compensation as independent variables,
NeWOM as the dependent variable, and service importance,
severity, and blame as controls. The results show significant
main effects of proactivity-reactivity, F(2, 349)¼ 7.76, p < .01,
Z2 ¼ .04, and compensation level, F(3, 349) ¼ 4.93, p < .01,
Z2 ¼ .04. Importantly, the proactivity-reactivity by compensa-
tion interaction is significant, F(6, 349) ¼ 2.14, p < .05, Z2 ¼
.04. To probe the interaction, we looked at each proactivity-
reactivity degree (proactive-home, default reactive-gate, and
very reactive-plane) separately, and then we compared the
NeWOM levels at T2 versus T1 for the four compensation
levels (see Figure 2).
For the proactive-home condition, all four levels of com-
pensation significantly reduce NeWOM at T2 compared to the
NeWOM at T1 (see Web Appendix A5). Post hoc tests were
conducted to see if there was a significant difference in
NeWOM at T2 following different compensation levels at each
proactivity-reactivity degree. The results show that for the
proactive-home condition, there is no significant difference
in NeWOM between the four compensation levels in T2,
MUS$675 ¼ 3.46, MUS$1,350 ¼ 3.65, MUS$2,700 ¼ 3.38,
MUS$10,000 ¼ 3.47; F(3, 349) ¼ 0.14, p ¼ .94, indicating that
compensation lower than the reference level of US$1,350 is
sufficient. For the default reactive-gate condition, only three
compensation levels, medium (US$1,350), high (US$2,700),
and excessive (US$10,000) significantly reduce NeWOM, but
low compensation (US$675) does not. Post hoc tests reveal that
there is no significant difference on NeWOM between
US$1,350 (MUS$1,350 ¼ 3.76) and higher levels (MUS$2,700 ¼
3.56, p ¼ .81; MUS$10,000 ¼ 3.47, p ¼ .58), suggesting that
US$1,350 is the best level. For the very reactive condition,
only excessive compensation (US$10,000) reduces NeWOM
(M ¼ 3.50), and it differs significantly from the other levels
(MUS$675 ¼ 4.83, p < .01; MUS$1,350 ¼ 4.78, p < .01; MUS$2,700
¼ 4.90, p < .05).
Discussion
Study 2a supports Hypothesis 2: The more proactive (reactive)
the firm is, the less (more) compensation is required to reduce
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NeWOM. Our results reveal that when firms offload passen-
gers proactively (i.e., at home), any compensation level (as low
as 50% of the legal requirement) equally reduces NeWOM.
When passengers are offloaded at the gate, firms must offer
US$1,350 (100% of the legal requirement) to reduce NeWOM.
A very reactive approach (in the plane) requires as much as
US$10,000 compensation (700% of the legal requirement).
Study 2b: Proactive-Home Offloading
Purpose, Sample, and Procedure
Study 2b refines the appropriate compensation level in the
proactive-home condition. As all compensation levels were
effective in Study 2a, we looked at compensation levels below
US$675 to find a level that is still effective but imposes the
lowest monetary expense. To cover the entire range, we
divided the range into equally distant groups each roughly
US$175 apart from the top (US$675 from the previous Study)
and bottom of the range (US$0), yielding four groups for Study
2b (a zero compensation group was not needed, as it was being
measured at T1).
Using the core scenario of the proactive-home condition
from Study 2a, we employed a single factor experimental
design with four compensation levels (US$150, US$325,
US$500, US$675). In total, 143 U.S. participants (Mage ¼
32.7, female ¼ 63.6%) from Clickworker completed the ques-
tionnaire. Again, NeWOM was measured before (T1: a ¼
88%) and after (T2: a ¼ 94%) being exposed to the compen-
sation. The same scales for NeWOM, the control variables, and
manipulation check as in Study 2a were used.
Manipulation Check
Of the respondents, 99% correctly indicated that they received
the overbooking information at home. Removing the respon-
dents with incorrect answers yielded a final sample of
141 participants; they perceived the scenario as realistic
(MRealism ¼ 5.80 > 4.00, p < .001).
Results and Discussion
Figure 2 depicts the mean values of NeWOM at T1 and T2
across different compensation levels. A repeated measure
Figure 2. Negative electronic word-of-mouth estimated means in Study Set 2.
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ANCOVA revealed that all four compensation levels signifi-
cantly reduce NeWOM at T2 compared to NeWOM at T1
(Web Appendix A5). A post hoc test showed no significant
difference between the four compensation levels at T2,
MUS$150 ¼ 3.98, MUS$325 ¼ 4.01, MUS$500 ¼ 3.88, MUS$675
¼ 3.61; F(3, 134) ¼ 0.45, p ¼ .72.
These results show that when firms proactively handle over-
booking by informing customers at home, any compensation as
low as US$150 (about 10% of the legal amount) can be effec-
tive in reducing NeWOM. This finding further highlights that
proactive management of overbooking can minimize custom-
ers’ negative reactions to offloading while reducing costs of
compensation.
Study 2c: Very Reactive-Plane Offloading
Purpose, Sample, and Procedure
This Study refines the required compensation level in the very
reactive-plane situation.
As in Study 2b, we sought to cover the entire range and also
have large enough groups to detect differences; thus, we
divided the range into equally distant groups between the lower
bound (US$2,700 from Study 2a) and the upper bound
(US$10,000) with roughly 100% increments over the legal
requirement (US$1,350). This resulted in six roughly equally
spaced groups with US$2,700 (200%), US$4,200 (300%),
US$5,700 (400%), US$7,200 (500%), US$8,700 (600%), and
US$10,000 (700%).
Using the core scenario of the plane condition from Study 2a,
we employed a single factor design with six compensation levels
as above. In total, 207 U.S. participants (Mage ¼ 33.3, female ¼
67.6%) from Clickworker completed the questionnaire.
NeWOM was measured before and after the manipulation, using
the same usual scale (a at T1 ¼ 86%, a at T2 ¼ 91%).
Manipulations Check
Overall, 99% of the respondents correctly indicated that
they received the overbooking information in the plane,
indicating a successful manipulation. Removing respondents
with incorrect answers yielded a final sample of 204 parti-
cipants, who perceived the scenario as realistic (MRealism ¼
5.85 > 4.00, p < .001).
Results and Discussion
Figure 2 depicts the mean values of NeWOM at T1 and T2
across different compensation levels for the very reactive-plane
situation. Results of a repeated measure ANCOVA show that
only the top four compensation levels (i.e., US$5,700 or
higher) significantly reduce NeWOM at T2 compared to T1
(Web Appendix A5). A post hoc test revealed that while
US$5,700 significantly reduces NeWOM (T2 ¼ 4.17 < T1 ¼
4.88, p < .05), the next highest level of compensation
(US$7,200) still yields a significantly lower NeWOM level at
T2 (MUS$5,700 ¼ 4.17 > MUS$7,200 ¼ 3.25, p < .05). Beyond
US$7,200, the two remaining compensation levels do not yield
significantly lower NeWOM at T2 compared to the preceding
level (MUS$8,700 ¼ 3.05, p ¼ .61; MUS$10,000 ¼ 2.97, p ¼ .47).
These results reveal that the appropriate compensation level
when offloading passengers in the plane is US$7,200 (about
500% of the legal amount). While offering US$5,700 can also
significantly reduce NeWOM, airlines can still benefit by
offering higher compensation; but overcompensating beyond
US$7,200 would not be worthwhile. Given that airlines have
recently increased the highest compensation for offloading pas-
sengers to US$10,000 (Hankel 2017), this finding can lead to
major cost savings for airlines.
Study 3a: Voluntary Proactive-Home
Offloading
Purpose, Sample, and Procedure
The set of Studies 3 complements Studies 2 by examining the
most effective compensation level in the specific context of
voluntary offloading. Accordingly, while Studies 2 implied
voluntary offloading for home and involuntary offloading for
gate and plane, we now make explicit that the travelers volun-
teered at home (Study 3a) and did or did not volunteer at the
gate (Study 3b), or in the plane (Study 3c). In addition, Study
3a focuses on the necessary compensation level at different
intervention times in the proactive home condition.
Using the core scenario of the proactive-home situation
from Study 2a, we employed a 3 (intervention time: 48, 24,
and 5 hours)  2 (compensation level: US$150 vs. US$75)
experimental design. The intervention times were based on the
expert interview results. Here, 5 hours represent the last oppor-
tunity to inform passengers proactively; it conservatively esti-
mates that passengers are expected to be at the airport 3 hours
before departure and may need 2 hours to get to the airport.
Regarding compensation, we examined US$150 (10% of the
legal amount, the lowest level from Study 2b which was still
shown to be effective) and US$75 (5% of the legal amount) to
explore whether a lower compensation level is still effective.
In total, 209 U.S. participants were recruited from Qualtrics
(MAge ¼ 38.9, female ¼ 51.2%). NeWOM (a ¼ 93%) and
controls were measured using the same scales as in the previous
studies. We also added complaint intention as the second form
of voice according to Hirschman (1970), measured with 5 items
(e.g., I would ask to speak to the manager on duty; a ¼ 89%;
Maute and Forrester 1993).
Manipulation Check
As intervention time was manipulated directly, an explicit
manipulation check was not deemed necessary. The scenarios
were perceived as realistic (MRealism ¼ 5.66 > 4.00, p < .001).
We also checked that participants perceived the interventions
as proactive using the proactivity scale from Study 1 (a ¼ .93).
The results indicate proactivity in all three conditions with a
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score higher than the scale midpoint (all ps < .05), and differ-
ences across conditions were minimal.2
Results and Discussion
Figure 3 depicts the mean values of NeWOM across the experi-
mental conditions. An ANCOVA showed that the main effects
of proactivity (p ¼ .23) and compensation level (p ¼ .63) as
well as their interaction (p ¼ .91) are insignificant. Further-
more, we examined the effects of compensation at different
proactivity levels through simple main effect analyses. Again,
we found no significant differences between the two compen-
sation levels for 48 hours (MUS$150¼ 3.02, MUS$75¼ 2.90, p¼
.78), 24 hours (MUS$150 ¼ 3.43, MUS$75 ¼ 3.44, p ¼ .97), or 5
hours (MUS$150 ¼ 3.37, MUS$75 ¼ 3.16, p ¼ .57). We observed
a similar pattern of results when using complaint intention as a
dependent variable (Web Appendix B2).
The results show that as long as airlines proactively ask
customers to volunteer to be offloaded, they can mitigate
the negative consequences at low levels of compensation.
This is an important finding as airlines could delay contact-
ing their passengers until 5 hours before a flight. This
shorter notice enables airlines to fine-tune their estimate
of no-shows and minimize offloading while securing high
load factors. In addition, when firms proactively handle off-
loading a compensation as low as US$75 (5% of the legal
requirement) can be effective.
Study 3b: Voluntary Reactive-Gate
Offloading
Purpose, Sample, and Procedure
Study 3b tests Hypothesis 3 and the amount of compensation
needed to reduce NeWOM and complaint intentions, depend-
ing on whether offloading at the gate happens voluntarily or
not. We used a 2 (voluntary vs. involuntary)  2 (compensa-
tion: US$1,350 vs. US$675) between-subjects design. The
sample comprised 134 U.S. participants recruited via Qualtrics
(Mage ¼ 41.3, female ¼ 55.2%).
As in Study 1, the first part of the scenario describes a
passenger planning to leave for a holiday who is approached
by an airline representative at the gate. Next, voluntariness and
compensation level were manipulated. In the voluntary condi-
tion, the passenger is informed that the flight is overbooked and
that they are looking for volunteers to travel on a later flight. In
the involuntary condition, the passenger is informed that the
flight is overbooked and they have been selected to be off-
loaded and, therefore, must travel on a later flight. Monetary
compensation is offered in both conditions: the levels were
US$1,350 (100% of the legal requirement, which also was an
effective level based on involuntary offloading in Study 2) and
US$675 (50% of the legal requirement). The same scales as in
the earlier studies were used for NeWOM (a ¼ .92), complaint
intention (a ¼ .90), and the controls.
Manipulation Check
The manipulation of voluntariness was checked using 4 items
(e.g., I volunteered to be bumped and travel with a later flight;
a ¼ .94) on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The mean values dif-
fered significantly between the groups in the desired direction
(MVoluntary ¼ 5.71 > MInvoluntary ¼ 2.02, p < .001), indicating
successful manipulation. The respondents perceived the sce-
narios as realistic (MRealism ¼ 5.81 > 4.00, p < .001).
Results and Discussion
Figure 3 depicts the mean values of NeWOM across condi-
tions. As in Study 3a, an ANCOVA was conducted with volun-
tariness and compensation level as independent variables,
NeWOM as the dependent variable, and the same control vari-
ables. The ANCOVA revealed that the effect of voluntariness
is significant, F(1, 127) ¼ 15.84, p < .001, Z2 ¼ .11, but the
effect of compensation level is not (p ¼ .25). Importantly, the
interaction of compensation level with voluntariness is
Figure 3. Negative electronic word-of-mouth estimated means in
Study Set 3.
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significant (F ¼ 10.28, p < .01, Z2 ¼ .08). To probe the inter-
action, we examined the simple main effects. There is no sig-
nificant difference between the two compensation levels for
voluntary offloading (MUS$1,350 ¼ 3.20, MUS$675 ¼ 2.64, p ¼
.13), but the difference is significant for involuntary offloading
(MUS$1,350 ¼ 3.45, MUS$675 ¼ 4.64, p < .01). The results for
complaint intention are similar (see Web Appendix B2).
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, these results show that volun-
tariness moderates the effects of compensation on customers’
responses. Specifically, when passengers are involuntarily off-
loaded, 100% of legal requirement (i.e., US$1,350) is needed to
reduce negative customer responses (note, this finding is con-
sistent with Study 2a, which also did not give passengers a
choice). However, if offloading is done voluntarily, Study 3b
shows that 50% less compensation is still effective in reducing
NeWOM and complaint intentions.
Study 3c: Voluntary Very Reactive-Plane
Offloading
Purpose, Sample, and Procedure
Study 3c further tests Hypothesis 3 and how much compensa-
tion is effective in reducing NeWOM and complaint intentions
when offloading in the plane is done voluntarily or not. We
used a 2 (voluntariness: voluntary vs. involuntary)  3 (com-
pensation level: US$1,350, US$2,700, and US$5,400)
between-subjects design. The sample comprised 162 U.S. par-
ticipants from Qualtrics (Mage ¼ 39.5, female ¼ 46.9%).
As in Study 1, the first part of the scenario described a
passenger who is going on a holiday but has already boarded
the plane when approached by a representative. The voluntari-
ness manipulations were almost identical to Study 3b (but
adapted to the plane context). Unlike what was done in Studies
1 and 2c, the phrase escorting out of the plane was avoided
because it could imply some form of aggression. The three
compensation levels were determined as follows: US$5,400
(400% of the legal requirement), which was the lowest com-
pensation level that was effective in reducing customers’ neg-
ative responses in Study 2c: US$2,700 (200% of the legal level)
and US$1,350 (100% of the legal level). We used the same
scales as in Study 3a.
Manipulation Check
The manipulation of voluntariness was checked by the same 4
items as in Study 3b (a ¼ .90). The mean values differed
significantly between the two groups in the desired direction
(MVoluntary ¼ 5.81 > MInvoluntary ¼ 2.28, p < .001), indicating
successful manipulation. The subjects perceived the scenarios
as realistic (MRealism ¼ 5.38 > 4.00, p < .001).
Results and Discussion
As in Study 3b, an ANCOVA was conducted with voluntari-
ness and compensation level as the independent variables,
NeWOM as the dependent variable, and our controls (see Fig-
ure 3). The ANCOVA shows that the effect of voluntariness is
significant, F(1, 153) ¼ 12.37, p < .01, Z2 ¼ .08; the effect of
compensation level is not (p ¼ .19); but their interaction is
significant, F(2, 153) ¼ 5.23, p < .01, Z2 ¼ .06.
Simple main effect analyses show no significant difference
between the three compensation levels for voluntary offloading
(MUS$5,400 ¼ 3.09, MUS$2,700 ¼ 2.23, MUS$1,350 ¼ 2.74, p ¼
.48), but the difference is significant for involuntary offloading
(MUS$5,400 ¼ 3.28, MUS$2,700 ¼ 3.66, MUS$1,350 ¼ 4.71, p <
.01). Pairwise comparisons among involuntary conditions
reveal that compared with the US$1,350 compensation, both
US$2,700 (p < .05) and US$5,400 (p < .01) are more effective
in reducing NeWOM; but the difference between the
US$5,400 and US$2,700 groups is not significant (p ¼ .35).
The results for complaint intention are generally consistent
with the depicted pattern (Web Appendix B2).
Our results show that voluntariness also moderates the
effects of compensation on customers’ reactions in the plane
offloading condition. Specifically, while the results of Study 2c
show that involuntarily (and forcibly) offloading passengers in
the plane would require at least 400% (but ideally 500%) of the
legal compensation level to reduce NeWOM, the current
results indicate that if offloading is done voluntarily, 100%
of the legal requirement would be sufficient to reduce NeWOM
and complaint intentions. However, when passengers are invo-
luntarily (but not aggressively) offloaded, they should be
offered around 200% of the legal requirement to significantly
reduce NeWOM.
Study 4: Modeling the Profitability Impact
Purpose and Approach
Study 4 examines the impact of compensation on an airline’s
profitability in various scenarios using Monte Carlo simula-
tions and prototypical models for airplane capacities and ticket
pricing. The models are based on five compensation levels
identified in our previous studies. Specifically, we use the min-
imal effective compensation for the five following situations:
the home condition, the voluntary gate condition, the involun-
tary gate condition, the involuntary plane condition without
aggression, and the involuntary plane condition with aggres-
sion. As the “involuntary gate” and “voluntary plane” condi-
tions share the same basic compensation parameter, we present
only one model for these two situations.
We focused on an airline’s achievable net revenue from
ticket sales regarding a single flight with excess demand. As
cancellations and no-shows are stochastic, we sought to simu-
late the expected net revenue E[Net Revenue] for representa-
tive combinations of ticket price and flight capacity together
with the required compensation levels identified in Studies 3.
E[Net Revenue] is the difference of expected revenue E[Rev-
enue] due to ticket sales and expected denied boarding costs
E[Costs] due to offloading an uncertain number of passengers:
E[Net Revenue] ¼ E[Revenue]  E[Cost]. To estimate
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revenue, denied boarding costs, and net revenue, we applied a
static overbooking model to the sales process for a given flight.
The idea behind a static model is to replace the physical
capacity with a fictitious overbooking level, that is, the maxi-
mum number of reservations the airline would be willing to
accept. In doing so, the overbooking process can be separated
from the actual booking control (i.e., dynamic pricing or avail-
ability control), while a proxy for the latter can be used to
assess the impact of overbooking decisions. Thus, on the down-
side, static models simplify the temporal dynamics of reserva-
tions, no-shows, and cancellations. Yet airlines often use static
models because of their robustness and simplicity and because
they can reasonably approximate far more complex dynamic
models (Aydın et al. 2012). Further, these models impose
mild assumptions on the sales and offloading process and are
less restrictive than dynamic models. Hence, the assumptions
of Study 4 are in line with standard revenue management
models as well as with those of the experiments conducted
in Studies 1–3.
We made the following standard assumptions regarding the
sequence of events (Talluri and Van Ryzin 2006). First, cus-
tomers book the flight and pay a ticket price, until the over-
booking level is reached. Because of the separation of the
overbooking process and dynamic booking control, we can use
an average ticket price paid by customers. Second, a random
number of booked customers decide to cancel the flight or
simply not to check-in. The corresponding ticket prices are not
refunded. The remaining customers, called show ups, “survive”
the booking process. When working with a static overbooking
model, we can use a binomial distribution with an average
show-up probability. Third, if the number of show ups exceeds
the flight capacity, the airline has to offload the excess demand.
It should be noted that the point of time when the airline
informs customers about being offloaded is assumed to be after
the decision to take the flight (i.e., it belongs to show ups). This
assumption is mild, because even in the proactive-home con-
dition, most customers often decide whether or not to take a
flight. They even check in online more than 5 hours before
departure—the latest point in time when the airline informs
customers at home (see Study 3a). Even if not all customers
have checked in, reliable predictions about the number of show
ups are possible at this late point in time. A bumped customer
receives a refund of the ticket and an extra compensation,
which depends on whether offloading occurs at the gate, at
home, or in the plane.
The airline wants to determine the optimal overbooking
level (denoted by b*) to maximize net revenue. We analyzed
the implications when using the five compensation levels con-
sidered as sufficient across the three proactivity conditions:
US$75 (5% of legal requirement for home, Study 3a), US$675
(50% for gate-voluntary, Study 3b), US$1,350 (100% for
gate-involuntary/plane voluntary, Study 3b and 3c, respec-
tively), US$2,700 (200% for plane-involuntary without
aggression, Study 3c), and US$7,200 (500% for plane-
involuntary with aggression, Study 2c).
We simulated six scenarios, varying two levels of plane
capacity c 2 f200; 500gð Þ and three levels of average ticket
price p 2 f100; 500; 1; 000gð Þ. Capacities were chosen to be
representative of a small domestic flight and a larger interna-
tional flight. In a similar vein, the ticket prices resembled typ-
ical one-way prices for short-haul, medium-haul, and long-haul
flights. In all scenarios, we assumed that the average passenger
show-up probability is P ¼ :95, which corresponds to the com-
monly used value in revenue management research on over-
booking (Erdelyi and Topaloglu 2010; Topaloglu et al. 2012).
We also tested other show up probabilities. As the results and
insights are similar, we do not report them here.
Results
In all scenarios, the expected values were approximated as
averages over 10,000 simulations of the sales process. We start
by analyzing the expected number of bumped customers
E[Bumped], since it is required to compute the net revenue
E[Net Revenue]. Only when the overbooking level is signifi-
cantly greater than the capacity may the airline need to offload
customers. For example, in scenarios with capacity c¼200, for
overbooking levels of 210 or lower with a show-up probability
of 95%, the airline needs to offload at most one customer (see
Web Appendix B3). The accumulated probability that fewer
customers than the capacity will show up is still rather high for
overbooking levels lower than 210.
From E[Bumped], we can analyze the monetary impact of
the considered compensation levels (Figure 4, Panel A). Each
subgraph refers to one of the six considered scenarios (capacity
c, ticket price p), where the expected revenue E[Revenue], the
expected denied boarding costs E[Costs] for the five compen-
sation levels, and the resulting net revenue E[Net Revenue] for
the five compensation levels are plotted according to overbook-
ing level b. Thereby, E[Net Revenue] is given by the difference
of E[Revenue] (dashed line) and E[Costs] (gray lines). The
optimal overbooking level can be deduced from the maximum
value of the E[Net Revenue]-plots. For example, in the sce-
nario (c ¼ 200, p ¼ 100), the optimal overbooking levels are
b* ¼ 207, b* ¼ 206, b* ¼ 205, b* ¼ 204, and b* ¼ 203
for compensation levels 5% (proactive-home), 50% (gate-
voluntary), 100% (default gate-involuntary), 200% (plane-
involuntary without aggression), and 500% (plane-involuntary
with aggression), respectively.
It can be seen that a higher compensation level leads to a
more conservative overbooking level and, vice versa, a lower
compensation level leads to more aggressive overbooking. A
lower compensation level of 5% (the appropriate amount for
the home condition) has three important effects on the opera-
tional planning of the flight (compared to a compensation level
of 100%). First, the airline may allow a higher number of
customers to book a ticket, which contributes to the expected
revenue. Second, a slightly higher number of customers are
likely be offloaded. Third, these bumped customers get a lower
compensation. As can be observed from Figure 4 (Panel A), in
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total, these three effects turn out to be profitable in all six
scenarios.
Finally, in Figure 4 (Panel B), we use the compensation
level of l ¼ 100% (default reactive-gate condition) as the
reference point to further quantify the observed potential net
revenue losses along with compensation levels l¼ 500% or l¼
200% as well as the observed potential net revenue improve-
ments for compensation levels l ¼ 5% or l ¼ 2%. For this
Figure 4. Simulation results (Study 4). (Panel A) Analysis of expected revenue, denial boarding costs, and net revenue. (Panel B) Potential net
revenue impacts l ¼ 500%, l ¼ 200%, l ¼ 50%, and l ¼ 5% compared to l ¼ 100%.
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purpose, we use the optimal overbooking levels and the corre-
sponding optimal expected net revenue along with different
compensation levels (as they can be deduced from Figure 4,
Panel A). The left subgraph of Figure 4 (Panel B) refers to
absolute values, the right subgraph to values in percentages.
For example, in a given scenario (c ¼ 200, p ¼ 500), using a
compensation level of l ¼ 5% (or l ¼ 500%) instead of l ¼
100% may lead to an absolute improvement (loss) of expected
net revenue of aroundþUS$760 (US$870) for this flight. The
corresponding relative improvements (losses) are around
þ.75% (.85%). Considerable differences resulting from the
different compensation levels are observed for ticket prices of
p ¼ 500 upward. This is because the impact of prohibiting or
allowing more reservations on the expected revenue is higher
than the impact on the expected denied boarding costs. Regard-
ing the capacity c, the absolute net revenue differences are
naturally higher for a higher flight capacity, and the relative
net revenue differences are higher for a lower flight capacity.
Discussion
Study 4 relies on a common static overbooking model that
allows us to simplify the inherent dynamics, for example, regard-
ing the process and point of time by which customers are
informed about being offloaded. The results support our prior
findings about using higher proactivity with a lower compensa-
tion level. Specifically, feeding the overbooking tools of airlines’
software systems with a low compensation (i.e., 5% of legal
amount), when informing customers before they head to the
airport, may result in additional net revenue (up to 1.3%). In
contrast, a rather high compensation (i.e., c. 500% of legal
amount), which would be necessary for a significant reduction
of NeWOM when offloading customers in the plane (aggres-
sively), may lead to considerable net revenue losses (up to
1.0%). In addition to the lower compensation costs, net reven-
ues are boosted by higher load factors and related ticket sales.
General Discussion and Theoretical
Implications
Flight overbooking is pervasive and offers benefits to both
firms (i.e., higher revenue) and their customers (i.e., lower
prices and more available capacity; Powley 2017), but research
on its dark side is limited. Prior studies show that overbooking
can reduce customer satisfaction (Wehner, López-Bonilla, and
Santos 2018), perceived justice, and loyalty (Wangenheim and
Bayón 2007). Dissatisfied customers often share their negative
emotions on social media, and this can damage firms’ image
and financial performance (Benoit 2018). Further, firms end up
paying hefty compensation to involuntarily bumped customers.
Hence, identifying appropriate compensation amounts to
decrease NeWOM by proactively offloading passengers is an
important topic for service research, and the current research
makes four key contributions.
First and foremost, we introduce proactivity as a novel
recovery tactic, thus filling an important research gap regarding
the prerecovery phase, which is addressed in less than 5% of
recovery studies (Khamitov, Grégoire, and Suri 2020; Van
Vaerenbergh et al. 2019). The two extant tactics in this
phase—that is, encouraging customers to file complaints (i.e.,
facilitation) and initiating a cocreated recovery (i.e., initia-
tion)—are relevant and insightful. We complement these tac-
tics by arguing that proactivity starts the prerecovery phase
even earlier. Indeed, proactivity brings forward the moment
when firms address a foreseeable failure.
This tactic is not only a novel remedy. It also responds to a
recent call made in favor of adaptive recovery, which proposes
that “one size does not fit all” and that service recovery should
be adapted according to contexts and types of customers (Kha-
mitov, Grégoire, and Suri 2020; Van Vaerenbergh et al. 2019).
Proactivity fits particularly well the context of the airline indus-
try, in which overbooking is an intentional service failure that
can be predicted with a reasonable level of precision, especially
with the development of AI. We specifically address the notion
of adaptiveness by identifying different compensation levels
for diverse degrees of proactivity.
Prior research does not agree on the amount most suitable
for bumped customers. Noone (2012) shows that there is no
significant difference between different levels of compensation
(e.g., 50%, 100%, and 200%), whereas Wangenheim and
Bayón (2007) suggest that airlines should offer higher than the
legal compensation to minimize the negative effects of over-
booking. We shed new light on these conflicting results by
showing that both recommendations can apply, depending on
the situation. On the one hand, for a highly proactive approach
(at home), monetary compensation as low as 5% of the legal
requirement can significantly reduce NeWOM; and overcom-
pensation (as high as 700%) does not have any added benefit.
On the other hand, in a very reactive approach, substantial
overcompensation is necessary to appease bumped travelers.
Our results reveal that, for a very reactive approach, 200% of
the legal requirement seems sufficient although offering up to
500% may be needed. When offloading occurs at the gate,
offering the legal requirement is advisable.
The second contribution refers to adapting compensation
amount according to the context of voluntary versus involun-
tary offloading. While proactive offloading at home is inher-
ently voluntary, this question becomes crucial in reactive (at
the gate) or very reactive (in the plane) situations. Here, our
research indicates that offering customers a choice—letting
them step back on a voluntary basis—can significantly reduce
both NeWOM and compensation. For voluntary offloading at
the gate, 50% of the legal requirement would be sufficient,
while in the plane, the required compensation can be reduced
to 100% of the legal prescription. These findings extend prior
research, which argues that giving customers a choice increases
perceived justice (Mattila and Cranage 2005). We show that
adaptive recovery again pays off, as firms can considerably
save by identifying customers who are willing to wait for
another flight.
As a third contribution, we confirm the relevance of equity
theory and Homans (1961) law of justice in the context of
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adaptive recovery. Prior studies show that perceived justice
explains customers’ reactions to overbooking (e.g., see Hwang
and Wen 2009; Wangenheim and Bayón 2007). We take the
extra step by revealing that justice can be restored by informing
passengers early; yet, this same perception is decreased when
they are informed late. Accordingly, simple precautions related
to timing can easily increase the “rewards to investments” ratio
as perceived by customers. Furthermore, we show that over-
booking is also closely linked to the notion of betrayal because
denying boarding is perceived as a norm-breaking violation
(e.g., Grégoire and Fisher 2008). Overall, we show that cus-
tomers’ reactions to overbooking are best explained by the
sequence: proactivity-reactivity  justice  betrayal 
NeWOM.
Our fourth contribution is to quantify how appropriate com-
pensation levels—as determined in the experiments—impact
airlines’ net revenues by accounting for different levels of
ticket price and plane capacity (e.g., see Hwang and Wen
2009; Wangenheim and Bayón 2007). Unlike most recovery
research—which is mostly experimental with a main focus on
customers’ reactions—we examine the effects of our predic-
tions on profitability. By doing so, we answer recent calls
urging recovery researchers to incorporate financial metrics
(Khamitov, Grégoire, and Suri 2020; Van Vaerenbergh et al.
2019). Although the estimated net revenue improvements (up
to 1.3%) are seemingly small, they are substantial for airlines
because they are achieved with limited additional fixed costs.
Therefore, such improvements directly contribute to operating
profit. Importantly, we highlight that being very reactive and
handling overbooking after boarding (e.g., offloading travelers
“aggressively”) requires much more compensation (up to
500%), fosters negative customer reactions, and leads to net
revenue losses (up to 1.0%).
Managerial Implications
Here are three representative quotes from three of our inter-
viewed experts: “Overbooking is a mandatory practice for vir-
tually all airlines,” “Some can be highly aggressive and
overbook by 10%–20%,” and “You better offload two custom-
ers rather than leaving one seat empty.” Overbooking is perva-
sive and is here to stay. In that respect, this research offers
valuable recommendations on how to implement offloading
and improve profitability.
Predicting the Number of No-shows
While some airlines predict the number of no-shows using
stochastic models or rules of thumb, others have already
embraced the merits of AI. We recommend that airlines use
AI-based models, feed them with historical data, such as peak
travel times, destination, and time of departure, and refine pre-
dictions with booking information and booking pace. Airlines
are advised to reintroduce reconfirmation of flights from 48
hours up to 8 hours before departure to improve the accuracy
of their predictions.
Choosing Customers to Be Offloaded
All airline experts emphasized that nobody should be offloaded
involuntarily. Instead, airlines should follow a “hierarchy of
passengers” as one expert put it, by first approaching customers
who are likely to give up their seat voluntarily. Indeed, these
passengers tend to be more flexible and are satisfied with lower
compensation. For example, these travelers may be economy
class passengers, students, or solo travelers. As summarized by
one expert, firms should “not touch premium passengers, fre-
quent flyers, families with young children, groups, and those
with connecting flights.” Selecting customers most amenable
for offloading requires analysis of a vast amount of data from
different systems and under time pressure. Consequently, rely-
ing on personnel at the gate to do this effectively and efficiently
is unlikely to work. However, using AI in the backroom to
highlight potentially suitable passengers and then let front-
line staff contact them to discuss potential offloading and the
related compensation seems to be the most effective approach
for such a complex analytical as well as an interpersonal and
emotional task (cf. Wirtz et al. 2018). Another expert confirms
that it is common practice for airlines to keep selling very
expensive last minute tickets to enhance their revenue, even
though they do not have the capacity. Here, they can offload
people with low-price tickets who are happy to volunteer with
minimal compensation (as low as US$75).
Proactive Offloading
When flights are overbooked, airlines often wait until passen-
gers are at the gate to select those to be offloaded. One expert
described this process as “still highly manual for many air-
lines.” This approach can be problematic, particularly in an age
when such treatments can attract attention on social media
(Kim and Lowrey 2015). We recommend that airlines should
inform passengers several hours before departure and before
they get to the airport. When doing so, airlines can increase net
revenues by up to 1.3%. At this early stage, customers will give
up their seats voluntarily for a very small amount.
It seems logical to increase the “compensation package” (as
an expert named it) as the departure time is getting closer. Yet
our results do not show differences regarding intervention time
for proactive measures. Regardless of informing customers 48,
24, or only 5 hours before departure, the required compensation
did not differ. Hence, airlines have some leeway regarding the
intervention time and may conduct offloading in batches,
depending on the severity of overbooking. It may be optimal
to offload passengers who are almost certain not to be able to
get a seat early (e.g., 48 hours in advance to allow them to more
easily make an alternative booking), and then fine-tune again
24 and 5 hours before departure.
Proactive offloading can be implemented by sending emails
or mobile notifications. A majority of airlines now have apps
through which people can check in, receive updates about any
delays, gate changes, and so on. Airlines could send notifica-
tions to selected customers offering them compensation and the
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opportunity to rebook on another flight. They can stop sending
these messages when enough passengers have accepted the
offer of being voluntarily offloaded. Two experts mentioned
that some airlines have already started to incorporate proactive
offloading into their online systems. They ask passengers at
online check-in if they would be willing to give up their seat
should there be a need for offloading. Passengers can then
specify, at check-in, the compensation for which they would
be willing to give up their seat. These proactive measures are
economical and give airlines increased flexibility; passengers
are also satisfied with the received compensation.
Offloading at the Gate and in the Plane
Offloading at the gate is a common practice in the airline
industry. However, we recommend that it should only be
applied if proactive offloading is not sufficient, or if the airline
has insufficient capabilities to predict the number of no-shows.
Again, airlines should first ask customers if they volunteer to be
offloaded and then offer these customers 50% of the legal
compensation prescription. Some people (e.g., college stu-
dents) may even wait for such opportunities to reduce their
travel costs. For involuntary offloading at the gate, we advise
paying 100% of the legally required amount.
Offloading in the plane should be avoided at all costs, as it
considerably fosters NeWOM and requires the highest level of
compensation. When airlines have boarded too many passen-
gers, they should first ask for volunteers and offer the legal
compensation. If nobody volunteers at this stage, firms should
increase compensation payout to about 200%. If there are still
no volunteers, they can increase the offer further but eventually
may need to select passengers to leave the plane in exchange
for up to 500% compensation to minimize NeWOM and other
complaints for involuntary offloading in the plane.
Using Creative Ticket Strategies
We also suggest that airlines could combine the suggested
proactive approach with creative ticket designs. For instance,
airlines could design tickets in a way that passengers with
nonrefundable tickets are motivated to inform the airline about
changes in their travel plans. Currently, passengers with non-
refundable tickets simply do not show at the gate. These cus-
tomers could be offered a small refund if they inform the airline
early about changes in their travel plans (Gallego and Şahin
2010) and thereby improve predictions of offloading require-
ments. Further, airlines could offer callable and flexi tickets
(Gallego, Kou, and Phillips 2008). Callable tickets could be
sold at discounted prices but come with a prespecified recall
price which is higher than the original ticket price paid but
lower than a full fare ticket. Flexi tickets enable airlines to
rebook passengers on a different flight within a prespecified
period (e.g., 48 hours). Both ticket types allow airlines to offer
seats to last minute business travelers at high ticket prices at a
predetermined cost of offloading.
Limitations and Future Research
This research has some limitations that offer avenues for future
research. First, we examined overbooking in the airline con-
text. This focus is intentional, as it is an important industry with
an estimated revenue of US$2.7 trillion (Gitto and Mancuso
2019); it is highly regulated and compensation for bumped
passengers is obligatory. As overbooking can be desirable in
any service with fixed capacity and uncertain demand, it is
promising to examine proactive and adaptive recovery in
denied service situations in other industries such as hotels,
restaurants, and car rentals (Wirtz et al. 2003).
Second, we used monetary compensation in the form of
cash. Prior research has also used vouchers although they may
not be as effective as cash compensation (Noone 2012). Fur-
ther, newer forms of payment (e.g., cryptocurrencies) are gain-
ing popularity. Some airlines (e.g., Taiwanese Airlines and
AirBaltic) and even airports, such as Brisbane International
Airport, now accept cryptocurrencies as a regular payment
(Wu and Chang 2019). Given the potential advantages of cryp-
tocurrencies over voucher (i.e., the ability to convert to cash or
spend at various retailers rather than being tied to one retailer
with a limited validity period) and even cash (i.e., the potential
rise in value due to major fluctuations), it would be useful to
examine the moderating role of compensation type (i.e., cash
vs. voucher vs. cryptocurrencies) on the effects of proactive
offloading on customers’ reactions.
Third, our research is a first step in better dealing with over-
booking. Specifically, the scenarios in our experimental studies
used outbound passengers (i.e., those leaving their home to go
on a trip), but it would also be interesting to examine whether
our findings are replicated for inbound passengers (i.e., those
who are coming back home from a trip). Other moderating
factors, such as cabin class (e.g., business vs. economy), time
of flight (e.g., night vs. day), type of flight (e.g., short vs. long
haul), the purpose of flying (e.g., work vs. holiday), and group
size (e.g., solo vs. group passengers), may also warrant further
examination.
In sum, enabling airlines to operate at 100% load factors
offers key stakeholders several benefits (e.g., lower cost per
passenger, higher revenue, making capacity available to more
travelers, and lower ticket prices). Our research examines novel
strategies of how to deal with overbooking cost-efficiently with
reduced negative customer responses. We hope to encourage
more studies on how airlines and other fixed-capacity indus-
tries can more effectively use proactive and adaptive recovery
to help them operate at higher levels of capacity utilization.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to sincerely thank the editor, associate editor,
and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive
comments on this article. Further, the authors gratefully acknowledge
the generous contribution in terms of time and feedback provided by
Sachin Goel, Founder and CEO, Optiontown, USA; Nicola Lange,
Senior Director First Class Service and Lounges, Hub Frankfurt,
Lufthansa, Germany; L. U. Chung Yuan, Divisional VP Operations
Control, Singapore Airlines; Shashank Nigam, CEO & Founder,
Nazifi et al. 17
SimpliFlying, Canada; and Joe Ooi, Vice President Network Revenue
Management, Singapore Airlines.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Prof. Wirtz
has received a research grant from the Ministry of Education, Singa-
pore; Project: Service Productivity and Innovation Research,
MOE2016-SSRTG-059.
ORCID iD
Amin Nazifi https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1898-7654
Katja Gelbrich https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0147-3064
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
1. At the time of acceptance of this article (May 2020), overbooking
does not seem like an immediate problem to address due to the
COVID-19 travel disruptions. Nevertheless, as airlines restart their
activities, overbooking should again become a pressing concern.
We expect a similar development as it has been seen after past
crises (e.g., SARS and MERS outbreaks) where airlines quickly
resumed overbooking—even more aggressively than before—to
breakeven and makeup for poor earnings during the disruption
period.
2. We found a significant difference in the proactivity score between
the 48-hour period (7.6) and the 5-hour period (6.6, p < .05), but no
significant difference with any pairwise comparison involving the
24-hour period (6.7, p > .05). Such a difference is not surprising
given the large gap between 5 and 48 hours. We do not believe that
this difference affects the validity of Study 3a since all conditions
are perceived as proactive.
References
Adams, J. S. (1965). “Inequity in Social Exchange,” Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 267-299. https://doi.org/10.
1016/S0065-2601(08)60108-2
Amaruchkul, Kannapha and Patipan Sae-Lim (2011), “Airline Over-
booking Models with Misspecification,” Journal of Air Transport
Management, 17 (2), 143-147.
Andreassen, Tor W. (2000), “Antecedents to Satisfaction with Service
Recovery,” European Journal of Marketing, 34 (1–2), 156-175.
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